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INTRODUCTION
“To compete and win in a global marketplace, companies have to
leverage every social and economic asset,” said Adena Friedman,
209
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President and CEO of Nasdaq on International Women’s Day, 2018. 1
Since her declaration, Friedman has helped Nasdaq win on the global
market by leveraging diversity. 2 In December of 2020, Friedman
submitted a proposal to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) asking the Commission to adopt a Corporate Gender Quota
(“CGQ”). 3 The quota would require all Nasdaq listed companies to
have at least one female and one diverse person on their board of
directors. 4 Companies who have not met the quota must provide an
explanation or risk delisting. 5
Friedman believes that with “cooperative capitalism” everyone
will have an opportunity to succeed and the overall economy will be
more prosperous. 6 CGQs are an example of cooperative capitalism:
government intervention that provides minority or diverse populations
the chance to compete for economic opportunities. 7 Friedman
describes herself as a “true believer” in capitalism and democracy, but
acknowledges capitalistic and democratic systems are not, on their
own, accessible to everyone. 8 Thus, Friedman believes that CGQs and
other quotas are key to ensuring equal access to employment. 9
Affording equal access to diverse individuals will in turn give
companies the advantage of a broader applicant pool, increasing the
likelihood that the best and the brightest are hired—no matter what

1. Nasdaq Commits to Further Empower Women in the Workplace,
NASDAQ, INC. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2018/03/08/1418353/0/en/Nasdaq-Commits-to-Further-EmpowerWomen-in-the-Workplace.html (emphasis added).
2. Id.
3. Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity,
SEC Release No. 34-90574, 85 Fed. Reg. 80472 ¶ 80472 (Dec. 4, 2020) [hereinafter
SEC Proposal].
4. Id. (. . . “to have at least one director who self-identifies as Black or African
American, Hispanic or Latinx, Asian, Native American or Alaska Native, Native
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, two or more races or ethnicities, or as LGBTQ+ . . .”).
5. Id. ¶ 80487.
6. Eben Shapiro, Adena Friedman, CEO of Nasdaq, on the Red-Hot Market
and Critics of Her Diversity Plan, TIME (Dec. 13, 2020, 6:50 AM),
https://time.com/5919962/nasdaq-ceo-adena-friedman-stocks/.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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they look like. 10 Therefore, to win in a global marketplace, companies
must diversify personnel. 11 Friedman has said:
Nasdaq strongly believes that women’s empowerment is a critical
pillar of business value creation, global sustainability and essential
to creating inclusive, prosperous economies. Nasdaq is committed
to giving women every opportunity to succeed and thrive because it
ultimately drives better outcomes for our business and
stakeholders. 12

Friedman herself is the first female to lead a major U.S.
Exchange. 13 Her life experiences, professional experiences (starting as
an intern for Nasdaq), 14 and her worldview have guided Nasdaq to
maintain its position as the second largest stock exchange in the
world, with a market capitalization of 23.46 trillion dollars. 15
Diversifying executive leadership, in particular, adds long-term
value to corporations. 16 Friedman exemplifies how females in power
can create policies and opportunities that account for the female
experience. As President and CEO of Nasdaq, she has utilized her
position to ensure females are being considered for board positions
despite their history of subordination in the corporate world. 17 In fact,
while women make up half of the world population, in 2018 they only
10. SEC Proposal, supra note 3, at 9.
11. As this Comment will discuss, France provides a powerful example of how
cooperative capitalism increases meaningful participation from diverse populations,
particularly females.
12. Nasdaq Commits to Further Empower Women in the Workplace, GLOBE
NEWSWIRE (Mar. 8, 2018 8:00 AM), https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2018/03/08/1418353/0/en/Nasdaq-Commits-to-Further-Empower-Womenin-the-Workplace.html.
13. Alexander Osipovich, Nasdaq Names Adena Friedman CEO, First Woman
to Lead Major U.S. Exchange, WALL ST. J. (updated Nov. 15, 2016, 11:41 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-names-adena-friedman-next-ceo-robertgreifeld-will-be-chairman-1479159822.
14. Id.
15. Largest stock exchange operators worldwide as of October 2021, by
market capitalization of listed companies, STATISTA (Aug. 31, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/270126/largest-stock-exchange-operators-bymarket-capitalization-of-listed-companies/.
16. SEC Proposal, supra note 3, at 6-7.
17. See Shapiro, supra note 6.
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occupied 16.9% of all global board seats and only 5.3% of board chair
positions.18
However, Friedman is also not entirely alone in her position as a
female executive. As of this year, thirty women run S&P 500
companies and although this number is small, these women are
making a massive impact. 19 These thirty companies include: General
Motors, The Hershey Company, Best Buy, CVS Health Corporation,
The Clorox Company, and Northrop Grumman Corporation. 20
Women in executive leadership positions can make decisions and
promote other decision makers who will account for work-life
balance, which will support the longevity of women in these
positions.21
Still, to increase female participation in executive decisionmaking, women must first be invited to the table; CGQs make that
invitation mandatory (in most cases). 22 Only then can society move
toward a more egalitarian capitalist structure where women are not
only sitting at the table but invited to meaningfully participate in
executive decision-making.
This comment explains the transnational corporate-gender-quota
trend and argues the SEC should adopt Nasdaq’s CGQ proposal to
ensure women are present on United States boards. This comment also
contends that meaningful participation from female executives—a
precursor to gender equity—will not come to fruition without also

18. Women on Corporate Boards (Quick Take), CATALYST (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-on-corporate-boards/ [hereinafter Women
on Corporate Boards].
19. Women CEOs of the S&P 500, CATALYST (Aug. 30, 2021),
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-ceos-of-the-sp-500/.
20. Id.
21. Work-life effectiveness is a talent management strategy that fosters strong
performance for both individuals and organizations over the long-term by promoting
work environments that are capable of responding to changes in business needs
quickly, creatively, and efficiently while providing employees the control they need
to work smarter, address their non-work priorities, and be resilient and effective.
Work-Life Effectiveness, CATALYST https://www.catalyst.org/topics/work-lifeeffectiveness/ (last visited May 27, 2021).
22. See Laura Cabeza-García et al., Legal and Cultural Factors as Catalysts
for Promoting Women in the Boardroom, 22 BRQ BUS. RSCH. Q. 56-57 (2019)
(CGQs take many forms, from suggesting to requiring corporations to fill some
number of their director positions with female colleagues).
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considering the context in which gender inequality exists in America’s
formal and informal institutions. 23
Part I of this comment will discuss the context in which this
transnational trend for CGQs has spread, as well as the need for and
the challenges that surround increasing corporate board heterogeneity.
Part II will investigate France’s CGQ regime to understand the social
and political context in which France’s quota has achieved farreaching success in moving toward gender equity in the boardroom.
Part III will provide a similar look at the social and political context in
which the United States currently exists, as well as the challenges and
opportunities that could come from the SEC adopting a CGQ. Part IV
will provide suggestions for improving female participation on
corporate boards in a meaningful manner based on a comparison to
France, as well as lessons learned from the past eighteen years in
which CGQ’s have existed worldwide. 24
To achieve gender equity, women must first be invited to the
corporate board. However, gender equity will also require shifting
internal biases and upending the informal institutions that have
sustained male dominated leadership on corporate boards. Only then
will women be able to make decisions from positions of power and
leadership.
I. EUROPEAN CORPORATE GENDER QUOTAS
CGQs emerged in Europe as political leaders began to realize that
females were grossly underrepresented on corporate boards despite
being, on average, more educated than their male counterparts and
making up half of the population. 25 In fact, in 2015, there were more
23. Id. at 58 (referring to formal institutions that have explicit rules in a
society and informal institutions that have constraints people in a society impose
upon themselves to structure their relations with others).
24. That is, since the international community first began developing and
adopting CGQs.
25. European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, 19
(2019) 2019 Report on equality between women and men in the EU,
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f3dd1274-7788-11e9-9f0501aa75ed71a1/; see also Kristine Nergaard, Government Proposes Gender Quotas
(June
24,
2003),
on
Company
Boards,
EUROFOUND
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2003/government-proposesgender-quotas-on-company-boards (stating that as many as 70% did not have any
female board members at all).
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directors with the first names James, Robert, William, and John than
there were female directors. 26 Globally, the first CGQ was introduced
by Norway in 2003. 27 In light of Norway’s positive results—a 22%
increase in female board representation in its first five years—thirtytwo other countries have since adopted some form of boardroom
gender quota. 28
A. Norway’s Initiation of the CGQ Trend
Norway exemplifies the power of CGQs in addressing corporate
board inequities. In 1999, the proportion of women on Norwegian
boards was only 5.9%, and only rose to 7.5% by 2002, the year before
the quota was implemented. 29 In Norway, board members are
generally chosen in the same manner as United States’ board
members: through a network of existing executives and directors. 30
These networks are made almost entirely of men and are extremely
insular. 31 However, the Norwegian CGQ forced boards to look
beyond directors’ go-to male-dominated networks for new, qualified,
and diverse board members. As a result, Norwegian executives, in
general, now come from a wide range of backgrounds and Norwegian
society has come to develop a new understanding of what executives
and other high-level leadership should look like. 32 Today, Norway
boasts that 35.5% of its board-seats are filled by women. 33 Norway
demonstrates—and research has shown—that gender equality

26. Aaron A. Dhir, What Norway Can Teach the U.S. About Getting More
ATLANTIC
(May
4,
2015),
Women
Into
Boardrooms,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/what-norway-can-teach-theus-about-getting-more-women-into-boardrooms/392195/.
27. Nergaard, supra note 25.
28. Cabeza-García et al., supra note 22, at 57.
29. Nergaard, supra note 25.
30. Dhir, supra note 26.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Katie Levans, Here are the Only 12 Women Sitting on Boards at
Charlotte’s Biggest Companies, AXOIS CHARLOTTE (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://charlotte.axios.com/66081/12-women-sitting-boards-charlottes-biggestcompanies/.
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primarily exists, or comes closer to existing, in countries where there
is regulatory pressure at an institutional level. 34
Norway, and the thirty-two other countries that adopted CGQ’s,
have benefitted from the intrinsic value that gender diversity adds to
corporations when they confront complex dilemmas. 35 Corporations
and governments, together, are the two primary organizing bodies that
fulfill the needs of almost eight billion people globally. 36 Government
and corporate board leadership affect how each entity handles its
respective responsibilities. 37 Overall, Norway and its predecessors
demonstrate that instilling hard laws requiring female representation
on corporate boards is necessary to ensure women are present at the
top of the corporate ladder.
B. Vitality of Hard Laws in Increasing Female Corporate
Board Participation
Legal institutions have undeniably played a key role in promoting
female representation on corporate boards via CGQs. 38 Countries
worldwide have taken a broad range of approaches in applying CGQs,
oftentimes reflecting the institutional and legal environments
responsible for corporate governance and their corresponding
regulatory routes. 39 These varied legal mechanisms also differ in
efficiency. 40
34. K.P. Parboteeah, et al., Managers’ Gender Role Attitudes: A Country
Institutional Profile Approach, 5 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 795-813 (2008).
35. Dhir, supra note 26.
36. Bob Zukis, How Women Will Save the Future, One Corporate Board at a
Time, FORBES (June 30, 2020, 10:19 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobzukis
2020/06/30/how-women-will-save-the-future-one-corporate-board-at-atime/?sh=79c58a687bc9.
37. Id.
38. See Tyler Winters & Madhuri Jacobs-Sharma, Gender Diversity on
Corporate Boards: The Competing Perspectives in the U.S. and the EU, COMPAR.
CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGUL. (2016) 1, 9; Julie Suk, Gender Parity and
State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate Boards, INT’L. J. CONST. L.
(Apr. 1, 2012) (Many European countries legally mandated CGQs following the
enactment of gender quota legislation for public offices).
39. See Ruth Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of
Corporate Governance Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 447-465
(2003).
40. Cabeza-García et al., supra note 22, at 58.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021

7

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2021], Art. 7

216 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
Two main formulas regulate gender demography on corporate
boards: 41 (1) positive or hard laws, 42 which impose gender quotas with
enforced penalties for non-compliance; and (2) soft laws, 43 which are
corporate governance code recommendations. 44 Soft laws are nonbinding suggestions and have been less effective in combating actual
boardroom homogeneity. 45 For example, Spain’s soft law consisted of
weak penalties for non-compliance, flexibility in corporate board
compliance, and implementation schedules that were significantly
longer than most countries with hard laws. 46 In the first nine years of
Spain’s gender quota implementation, it only increased its female
representation on boards to 9%. 47 It has since been held at a standstill
of 16% for the last three years. 48
In 2010, France, like Spain, enacted a soft law with gradually
increasing gender-representation standards for boards. 49 However,
legislators quickly realized the gradual, soft law approach was

41. See Heike Mensi-Klarbach & Cathrine Seierstad, Gender Quotas on
Corporate Boards: Similarities and Differences in Quota Scenarios, 17 EUR. MGMT.
R. 1, 3 (2020) (“. . .positive or hard laws versus targets or soft laws differ based on
the answer to this question: “Is it best to prescribe outcomes and force compliance,
or suggest outcomes and permit flexibility around their achievement? . . . hard
law[s] [are] . . . enforced by the state as opposed to voluntary codes.”).
42. Id. at 3. (“CBQs might differ in their levels of enforcement and wording
precision, which, taken together, affects the degree of hardness.”).
43. Id. at 1-2. (Soft approaches aim for incremental and gradual increases in
the number of women on boards and assume a shared desire to change the culture
and procedures for selecting and nominating board members.)
44. Aguilera & Jackson, supra note 39, at 447-48.
45. Siri Terjesen et al., Legislating a Woman’s Seat on the Board: Institutional
Factors Driving Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors, J. BUS. ETHICS (Jan. 28,
2014) 1, 12-13 (The existence of a recommendation or a ‘soft’ law might mean that
firms will only be interested in pretending to comply while still obtaining
recognition and other benefits from stakeholders and from the market. On the other
hand, enforcing a law with penalties for non-compliance means that, whether
companies agree with a specific practice or not, they are obliged to comply).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Aida Pelaez-Fernandez, Women in Senior Management Stagnant in
Corporate Spain at Only 16%, REUTERS (July 8, 2020, 10:15 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-women-companies-idINKBN2492QF.
49. Emmanuel Zenou et al., Gender Diversity on French Boards: Example of a
Success from a Hard Law, BURGUNDY SCH. BUS. 103, 104 (2017).
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ineffective. 50 The following year, France adopted a positive law
requiring companies to have at least 40% of each gender on their
boards. 51 By 2019, 44.3% of French board seats were held by brilliant,
high-achieving women. 52 French companies began complying
immediately and “wanted to secure the membership of the most
‘competent’ women for their boards before other firms came
calling.” 53
Overall, experts recommend enacting positive laws with strong
governmental sanctions and more efficient equality plans to realize
quicker and enduring female participation. 54 Even so, a dual focus on
formal institutions, including enacting legislation, and informal
institutions, including support for women once they are present on
corporate boards, are both necessary to induce meaningful
participation from female directors.
C. Improving Gender Equity through Formal and Informal
Institutional Changes
Although appointing women to corporate boards via hard laws is
one essential step toward gender equity, upending cultural and social
barriers is also necessary. CGQ case studies suggest State action
supporting “positive discrimination,” whether in the form of laws or
recommendations, will increase the presence of women on boards in
the short term. 55 However, cultural and social shifts also will need to
take place for long-term success of CGQs and overall gender equity in
the boardroom. 56 These studies attribute the exclusion of women from
boards to systematic gender discrimination rather than lack of
individual merit or of appropriate female candidates for positions. 57
50. Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More Than a Woman: Insights
into Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV 889, 894
(2015), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/993/.
51. Id. at 898.
52. Women on Corporate Boards, supra note 18.
53. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 50, at 899.
54. Id. at 899-900.
55. Cabeza-García et al., supra note 22, at 59 (citing Jennifer M. Piscopo &
Susan C. Muntean, Corporate Quotas and Symbolic Politics in Advanced
Democracies 39 J. WOMEN POL. & POL’Y 285-309 (2018).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Thus, unraveling both “formal” and “informal” institutional
constraints is necessary to ensure women are not only sitting on
corporate boards, but meaningfully contributing as well. 58
Formal institutions refer to explicit rules in a society and informal
institutions are constraints that people in a society impose upon
themselves to structure their relations with others. 59 CGQs could thus
be categorized as formal institutions, while executive decision making
and interpersonal relationship development among directors relate to
informal institutions.60
Countries with positive CGQ laws acknowledge the social and
cultural impediments to female participation in board-level
management positions: strong, positive CGQ laws sanction noncompliant managers who are swayed by discriminatory informal
structures. However, to ensure board member and shareholder buy-in,
the diversity quotas must also overcome informal institutional
barriers. 61 For example, although 75% of men agree teams with
women are more successful, they were also less likely to see value in
diversity programs, and even found too many diversity programs to be
unfair to men. 62
Therefore, informal changes may also be necessary to achieve the
result formal mechanisms purport to accomplish—increased gender
equality on corporate boards. According to a recent survey, the
primary obstacle for women seeking top management positions is
often a deep-seeded cultural attitude among male executives currently
in upper management. 63 Social science research suggests there is an
unconscious bias that men are more qualified to hold leadership roles
than women, further compounding the structural obstacles already
hindering women’s access in the boardroom. 64
Thus, even if women are now serving on boards, they may not
feel welcome to voice their opinions or change policies to be more
58. Id. at 58.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Sandrine Devillard, Sandra Sancier-Sultan, & Charlotte Werner, Why
Gender Diversity at the Top Remains a Challenge, MCKINSEY Q. (Apr. 1, 2014),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/whygender-diversity-at-the-top-remains-a-challenge.
63. Id.
64. Dhir, supra note 26.
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inclusive of the women in their companies. 65 Some of the cultural
issues that maintain these unconscious biases include lingering doubt
on behalf of male CEOs and executives about the value of diversity
initiatives as well as the psychological barriers women internally
face. 66 Only 62% of women surveyed believe children can coincide
with a C-suite career compared to 80% of men surveyed. 67
Women are also disproportionately affected by the additional
stress that is demanded of top executives who may be required to
make themselves available 24/7. 68 Around the clock availability
inevitably poses greater challenges for females, who are more often
caretakers in their families. 69 This phenomenon has been coined the
double shift. 70 Women who work a full day in the office oftentimes
come home to a full day’s worth of housework and caretaking as
well. 71 Changing corporate policies to account for the female
experience, including work-life balance, is crucial to achieving gender
equity. Generally, work-life balance for women, particularly female
caretakers, may be the deciding factor for many women seeking
executive-level careers. A random effect panel data model found
national commitments to safeguarding a women’s right to return to
work and a national investment in initiatives designed to enable
women to have better work life balance are both necessary to increase
female participation in the workforce and particularly in executive
roles. 72
Gender roles also affect behavior norms considered appropriate
for each sex: how men and women “should” behave. 73 Men and
65. Devillard et al., supra note 62.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. For further discussion of this phenomenon, see infra note 188 and
accompanying text.
71. Tiffany Burnes et al., Women in the Workplace 2021, MCKINSEY & CO.
(Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-andinclusion/women-in-the-wpratorkplace.
72. Johanne Grosvold, Bruce Rayton & Stephan Brammer, Women on
Corporate Boards: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 55 (8) BUS. SOC’Y., 1157,
1175 (2016).
73. See generally Nabanita Gupta, Nina Smith, Mette Verner, The Impact of
Nordic Countries’ Family Friendly Policies on Employment, Wages and Children, 6
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women are influenced by societal beliefs when assessing their own
capabilities. 74 In hyper masculine cultures, gender roles create a gap
between male and female values as they relate to income, recognition,
progress, and challenges. 75 Finland and Norway illustrate how
countries with low indices for masculinity and fewer power
discrepancies lead to the highest percentages of women in
management positions. 76 Thus, a feminine culture is more likely to
accept women in positions of power, and more likely to listen to and
follow those women. 77
Therefore, CGQ success requires consideration of both formal and
informal institutions. Countries like France with the greatest female
board participation have gendered welfare state provisions, leftleaning political governments, and policy initiatives for gender
equality both in the public realm and in the corporate domain. 78 The
social and cultural context in which the mandate arises also impacts
the public’s willingness to participate in gender mandates.
II. FRANCE’S SUCCESS WITH CGQS
France provides a particularly interesting case study to
demonstrate the need for hard laws coupled with social and cultural
dynamics that encourage female board participation. France’s political
and economic structures have skyrocketed female representation on
corporate boards. 79 Additionally, France’s capitalist economy
provides a complimentary analysis to later examine the potential
impact of the SEC adopting Nasdaq’s proposed CGQ in the United
States.
Rev. Econ. Household 65, 66-67 (2008) (providing an example of how prolonged
maternity leave for mothers and less maternity leave for fathers may actually have
adverse effects on women’s labor participation).
74. Meredith Meyer et al., Women are Underrepresented in Fields Where
Success is Believed to Require Brilliance, FRONTIERS IN PSYCH. (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00235/full.
75. Cabeza-García et al., supra note 22, at 60.
76. Id. at 61.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 57-58, 65.
79. See Heike Mensi-Klarbach & Cathrine Seierstad, Gender Quotas on
Corporate Boards: Similarities and Differences in Quota Scenarios, 17 EUR. MGMT.
REV. 615, 615 (2020).
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Mirroring the world’s population, women represent just over half
of France’s population. 80 The comparative statistics from Eurostat
show women have a higher level of education than men (32.8% of
woman have a graduate level education compared to 28% of men) 81
and a lower unemployment rate (9.6% versus 10.2%). 82 Nonetheless,
gender inequalities remain in many aspects of French life. 83 In 2010,
after the implementation of a “soft” law, the proportion of women
serving on corporate boards in France’s Cotation Assistée en
Continu’s (CAC) 84 top forty listed companies (CAC40) was 15%. 85 In
a sample of 103 listed companies outside the top forty companies, this
percentage was only 9.5%. 86
In 2011, France became the largest country to adopt a strict,
positive CGQ law—the “Copé Zimmermann” law. 87 France’s CGQ
compelled over 2,000 publicly traded companies to set a 40% floor for
each gender’s participation on corporate boards by 2017, with an
intermediary level of 20% in 2014. 88 Following the mere
announcement of this law in 2010, France’s average proportion of
female directors on boards of CAC40 companies increased from 10%
to 15%. 89 By 2016, “the 140 biggest listed companies (with
capitalization of more than 1 billion euros) had 36.7% female
participation on their boards.” 90 One year later, in March of 2017,
women comprised 42% of board members in France’s forty largest
companies. 91 Moreover, as of 2018, 42.3% of French board seats were
held by women. 92 Thus, France has endeavored to achieve gender

80. Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 104.
81. Id. (the gap was similar in 2008: 26.7% compared with 22.8%).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 105. (Employment rate, part-time work, remuneration, segregation in
occupation and also in the presence of women in Parliaments and senior ministers).
84. The CAC is France’s stock market index.
85. Id. at 114.
86. Id. at 103.
87. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 50, at 890.
88. Id. at 898; Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 103.
89. Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 103.
90. Id. at 104.
91. Women on Corporate Boards, supra note 18.
92. Id.
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equality by undoing structural inequities in the countries’ social,
political, and economic realms.
A. French Approach to Addressing Social, Political, and
Economic Inequalities
Gender equality policies developed in France during the 1970s.
These policies cover a wide range of social, political, and economic
life and have attributed to much of France’s social, political, and
economic success. 93 From 1972 to 2014, France passed twelve laws
supporting gender equality in employment and professional realms. 94
France
also
passed
several
legislative
initiatives to address gender parity in politics—including a series of
laws strengthening gender electoral quota schemes. 95 Additionally, an
uptick in France’s gender-based violence laws and sexual harassment
laws was seen throughout 2002, 2003, 2010, and 2012. 96
Arguably, the most important recent development in gender
equality policy is the “Law on Real Gender Equality,” which was
adopted in 2014 and promotes “an integrated and transversal approach
to gender equality.” 97 Previous laws were passed referencing specific
policy domains, whereas the “Law on Real Gender Equality”
encompasses all spheres of social life. 98 Changes to the French
Constitution were necessary for more sweeping gender equality
legislation and subsequent changes to the French political systems that
govern CGQs.
In 2000, the French legislature enacted a parity law championed
by socialists and feminists, which requires half of all female
candidates endorsed by political parties to be women. 99 Initially, the
Constitutional Council (responsible for authorizing and reviewing
laws prior to their implementation) rejected the legislature’s efforts to
enact this law. 100 However, through a supermajority, the legislature
93. Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 105.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 106.
96. Id. (Media and gender stereotypes have yet to be the target of legislative
efforts but may be an emerging domain.)
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 50, at 893.
100. Id. at 893.
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successfully amended the French Constitution, paving the way for the
enactment of this parity law. 101
The French legislature first adopted a CGQ in 2006, but the
Constitutional Council struck the law down, notwithstanding another
Constitutional amendment. 102 The Council considered CGQs to be a
separate issue from the parity quota because the latter requires sex
parity in political representation, not private, corporate
representation. 103 In response, the legislature passed yet another
constitutional amendment, Article 3, in 2008 to permit private quotas
to promote women “to positions of professional and social
responsibility. 104“ In addition, law makers inserted Article 1, which
“essentially established the duty to promote [sex] parity as
fundamental constitutional law.” 105 Following the 2008 modification,
the French Constitution now requires gender equality in public and
private sectors, which can be guaranteed through the implementation
of quotas. 106
Political elite buy-in has been key to ensuring gender equity
remains relevant in French culture. 107 In a public speech at a Paris
colloquium, conservative leader Jean-François Copé remarked, “[t]he
test of a society’s civilization is in how it treats its women.” 108 The
“conservative focus on sex was largely strategic,” according to some
legal academics. 109
The push for the quota came at the same time that conservatives
had moved to ban burqas and were trying to ban the wearing of long
skirts. By modernizing the corporate boardroom to include women,
conservatives more comfortably took a position against practices, such
as traditional Muslim dress. 110

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 894.
Id. at 897.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 895.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Aside from conservatives, government and labor stakeholders also
support the quota. 111 Jean Luc Châtel, the French Press Secretary,
noted that “the quota is not necessarily the best solution, but at the
same time we perceive that if we do not legislate, we will have a hard
time obtaining results.” 112 Châtel’s statement signaled the
Administration’s grudging agreement.
Adverse policymakers often still believe a more balanced
representation of both men and women is necessary in the corporate
world, but that the CGQ will not instigate changes where it matters
most: in corporate governance. 113 Former French Minister of Labor
Xavier Darcos said the quota should mandate the addition of women
to executive committees, arguing this is where a firm’s “real”
decisions are made. 114 Nevertheless, there is broad support for using
the CGQ as the first step toward lasting progress. France has also
demonstrated this first step should be demanded with robust sanctions
for noncompliance.
B. France’s Tough Sanctions: An Effective Effort to Increase
Female Board Participation
Before France passed its 2011 hard law, or compulsory mandate,
it attempted to implement a voluntary, soft law approach. Under this
approach, “Each board should consider what would be the desirable
balance within its membership . . . in particular as it regards the
representation of men and women.” 115 To encourage gender diversity
on corporate boards, the Association Française des Entreprises Privées
and Mouvement des Entreprises de France (AFEP-MEDEF) 116 stated,
each board should:
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 896.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Aline Poncelet & Talya Hutchinson, France, in BREAKING THE GLASS
CEILING WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM 90, 90-92 (Paul Hastings ed., 2018) quoted in
Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, AFEP-MEDEF (Amended
Apr. 2010) (English language version available at www.ecgi. org/code).
116. Id. (The AFEP-MEDEF Code is the code of choice for large cap
companies, including all of the companies making up the French CAC 40 Index, and
one of the most complete and stringent codes of the OECD member countries
according to the AFEP and MEDEF.)
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Reach and maintain a percentage of at least 20 women within a
period of three years and at least 40 women within a period six
years, from the date of publication of this recommendation or from
the date of the listing of the company’s shares on a regulated
market, whichever is later. 117

Notably, the quotas did not include the elected boards of
directors. 118 Corporations were expected to “comply or explain” the
reasons for non-compliance on their annual reports. 119 There were no
sanctions if a company explained the reasons for their noncompliance. 120
By 2011, it was clear that self-regulation via the voluntary
approach was not effective partly due to corporate directors’
acquiescence to informal institutional structures. 121 Most directors in
France are chosen and influenced by strong interlocking links between
other directors and corporations—even more so than in neighboring
countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany. 122 French
directors and corporations are also highly influenced by elites and
prestigious schools. 123 The standard French corporation consists of a
dense elite network organized around several state-owned firms. 124
Almost all corporate elites graduate from the most prestigious schools
including: Polytechnique, Ponts, Mines, Centrale, Telecoms, ENSAE,
Ecole Nationale de l’Administration (ENA), or HEC. 125 Thus, given
the dense network of board interlocks which undoubtedly play a
significant role in board nomination, voluntary guidelines made little
progress. In light of the stagnation from the soft law approach, the
French Parliament implemented a hard law, which gave France’s
largest companies a “serious and immediate incentive to change their
behavior.” 126

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See id. at 90 (quoting Code, Section 6.3).
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 110.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Poncelet & Hutchison, supra note 115, at 90.
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On January 27, 2011, after more than a year of discussions, the
French national assembly (Assemblée nationale) and the French
Congress (Sénat) passed legislation aimed at improving the
representation of women on corporate boards, the Copé Zimmermann
Law. 127 The Copé Zimmermann applies to all listed companies, nonlisted companies with revenues or total assets over 50 million euros,
or non-listed companies that employed at least 500 people in the last
three years. 128 In addition, the mandate required company boards to
have at least 40% of each gender by 2017. 129
The mandate also included a three-year transition period.130
During this period, corporate boards devoid of women were required
to appoint a female board member when replacing a male board
member whose mandate was expiring on the date of their next
shareholder meeting. 131 Additionally, by the end of the first three
years each gender should not represent less than 20% of the board.132
Notably, the law only applies to non-executive directorship
positions. 133 It also imposes “absolute gender quotas,” meaning, the
quotas must be reached regardless of available talent. 134 However, it
also states appointments should be made in accordance with the social
interest of the company. 135
The French legislature chose not to adopt a pecuniary sanction
under the Copé -Zimmermann Law, stating that top listed companies
would easily circumvent monetary sanctions. 136 Instead, the
legislature determined that if a company were to breach Copé Zimmermann Law by bringing on another male director when it was
not already in compliance with the mandate, the breach would nullify
127. Id. at 91.
128. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 50, at 898.
129. Id. at 898 (“Framed not as a sex-specific quota but a floor for both sexes,
the law required boards of directors, supervisory boards of private companies or
joint-stock companies of any size, listed and unlisted, to strive for an equal
representation of men and women.”).
130. Id. at 894.
131. Poncelet & Hutchison, supra note 115, at 91.
132. Id.
133. Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 114.
134. Poncelet & Hutchison, supra note 115, at 91.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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that director’s appointment. 137 In addition, any company that was not
in compliance must only make changes that positively contribute to
achieving its mandated gender ratio. 138 The legislature also
determined the next tier of sanctions would include suspending
director compensation from attendance fees until the board was
compliant. 139 As a result, the number of female non-executive
directors at France’s top companies rose to 42% from 2011 to 2017. 140
The Copé-Zimmermann was championed by the conservative
Union pour la Majorité Parlementaire (“UMP”) Party, led by thenPresident Nicolas Sarkozy. 141 Unsurprisingly, businesses were
initially resistant to the quota. 142 When private sector leaders
attempted to interfere with the passage of the quota (by advocating for
the previous voluntary measures), co-sponsor of the quota, Marie-Jo
Zimmerman opined that a quota was necessary to “get things to
move.” 143 The imposition of a strong compulsory regulation annulled
any impeding forces or groups that tried to oppose the increase in
female board representation. 144 “The recommendations published by
employers’ networks before the publication of the law were a [primary
force in driving] gender diversity on boards.” 145 Many wanted to be
the first to comply to ensure they could hire the best talent for their
company. 146
Despite the passage of the Copé -Zimmermann Law, France is
currently facing somewhat of a paradox that has hindered some of its
grand gender diversity ambitions. 147 On the one hand, as foreign
investment increases, France “is evolving towards Anglo-Saxon
governance, with sanctions decided by the market”. 148 In 2014, for
137. Id; BREDIN PRAT, HENGELER MUELLER, SLAUGHTER AND MAY, BOARDLEVEL GENDER QUOTAS IN THE UK, FRANCE AND GERMANY 8 (14th ed. 2016).
138. Id.
139. PRAT, supra note 137.
140. Poncelet & Hutchison, supra note 115, at 90.
141. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 50, at 895.
142. Id. To some extent, business remain resistant to the quota.
143. Id.
144. Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 116.
145. Id.
146. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 50, at 899.
147. Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 107.
148. Id.
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example, foreign investors owned 46.7% of CAC40 firms. 149 This
market may not favor women on corporate boards, particularly when
investing countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom
do not have strong mandates in place. 150 On the other hand, France is
seeing the role of stakeholders become increasingly important within
its borders. Unions and committees, employees, sustainable
development, and increasing corporate social responsibility are
influencing firm governance by creating specific constraints on
managers and other disciplinary mechanisms. 151 Stakeholder influence
and particular focus on corporate social responsibility, may make
women’s access to the board easier. 152
Moreover, within French borders, women’s networks are
developing in response to the quota, helping make the transition for
women joining corporate boards smoother. Networks, such as
Fédération des Femmes Administrateurs or Femmes Chefs
d’Entreprise, have established forums for women to share their
experiences and lessons learned in their roles as board members. 153
Public institutions have also developed training programs including
operational training and experience sharing of best practices for
corporate governance. These intuitions focus on complex,
international environments to help women take on director roles,
which could aid France overcome the paradox. 154
Overall, the strong mandate and careful sanctions within France
have led to an incredible rate of compliance with the CGQ. Because
boards are forced to make these changes, informal institutions are
responding with programs and tools to ensure the transitions are
smooth for corporations and their new directors.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 50, at 928.
153. Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 116-17.
154. See id. at 117. (“Public institutions and bodies also encourage training
approaches, and many training programmes emerged in French ‘Grandes Ecoles’,
universities or professional networks, such as Women Be European Board Ready by
ESSEC Business School, and programmes proposed by the Institut Français des
Administrateurs.”)
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C. France’s Continued Progress Toward a More Egalitarian
Society for Women
Gender equality has again taken the spotlight in France. In 2018,
President Emmanuel Macron declared gender equality the “grande
cause nationale” of his presidency and vowed to end the gender pay
gap. 155 He appointed Marlène Schiappa as the Minister of Gender
Equality to be spokesperson for gender equality in corporate
leadership. 156 “With a President dedicated to eradicating gender
inequality, [plus a] Minister of Gender Equality whose new tenure has
already included participation in the Women in Corporate Leadership
Initiative, the number of companies in compliance and who promote
women in leadership are expected to increase.” 157
The Copé Zimmermann Law has compelled a substantial and
immediate effect. 158 In 2006, women only accounted for 8% of board
members, and nearly a decade later France met its 40% quota. 159 From
2011 to 2016, the same proportion of male and female candidates
were appointed to boards of the largest companies. 160 Notably, other
appointment criteria largely did not change, selection based on
education and experience was equally rigorous for women and men. 161
However, there are growing pains associated with this move
toward gender parity. For example, despite the skills and experience
of some adept male directors, their office terms are not being renewed
in order to make way for women. 162 Also, the quota law is unable to
take into account a company’s unique characteristics and some
companies have claimed there are fewer qualified women in certain
industries. 163 For example, in the automotive industry board members

155. Poncelet & Hutchison, supra note 115, at 92 (citing Anne-Sylvanie
Chassany, Macron Prepares to Act on France’s Gender Pay Gap, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
7, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/7644706a-06ac-11e8-9e12-af73e8db3c71.
156. See id. (citing Marlène Schiappa, Minister of Gender Equality, Address at
the New York Stock Exchange (Jan. 31, 2018)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Zenou et al., supra note 49, at 117.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 118.
163. Id.
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should have an engineering background. 164 Automotive board
members expressed concern that an engineering background should be
prioritized over gender, arguing a female engineer can be appointed
for her technical skills rather than simply because she is a woman. 165
Another concern that has been raised about French CGQs relates
to a fear that the quotas lead to a reduction in the level of board human
capital. 166 Opponents to the quota argue that “compulsory levels of
women on corporate boards force boards to appoint directors based on
gender rather than skill.” 167 In spite of these opponents, a comparative
study of France and Canada (which adopted a voluntary “comply or
explain” initiative) concluded hard laws led to increased female
representation on corporate boards at a faster rate, “and that French
firms manage to find female candidates that meet the usual selection
criteria.” 168
As expressed by Agnès Touraine, President of French Institute of
Directors, there is large consensus that, “Quotas are never a victory
and should not be the solution. However, they are the only option
when there are no signs of a willingness to change the current
situation. Despite our preference for ‘soft law,’ we have to recognize
that regulations can speed up the progress.” 169 Given the leaps France
has made toward gender equity in light of CGQs, there is hope the
United States can experience similar successes. Nonetheless, both
formal and informal intuitions must be addressed.
III. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH: CONTINUED GENDER
DISPARITY IN THE BOARDROOM
In contrast to the French experience, the United States has seen far
fewer legislative initiatives to combat gender inequality. The World
Bank estimates 50.52% of America’s population was female in
2018. 170 Women now hold 22.6% of board seats among the United
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (e.g., experience as CEO, experience on other boards, international
and finance experience, and elitist education).
170. According to the World Bank, 49.58% of the global population was
female in 2018. See Population, Female (% of total population), THE WORLD BANK
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States’ largest publicly traded companies, which is only a 6.5%
increase over the last four years. 171 Notably, 60% of those seats were
newly created, rather than gained by women replacing men. 172
Further, Black and Asian/ Pacific Islander women are gaining seats
faster than any other group or gender in the United States, but they
still hold the fewest seats overall. 173
Gender parity initiatives in the United States have been introduced
on the state-level. In states and jurisdictions with compulsory quotas,
nearly three quarters of the corporations had at least 30% female
board participation in 2019. 174 However, only 20% of corporations in
jurisdictions without compulsory quotas reached the 30% mark, and
23% did not have any female directors. 175
Similar to France, women in the United States are generally more
educated than men. 176 Among 2017-2018 graduates, “women earned
more than half of the bachelor’s degrees (57.3%), master’s degrees
(60.1%), and doctorate degrees (53.5%).” 177 Of the 2016 to 2017
graduates, women also earned just over half of all professional
degrees, including law degrees and medical degrees. 178 In fact,
“women have earned more bachelor’s degrees than men since 1982,
more master’s degrees then men since 1987, and more doctorate
degrees than men since 2006.” 179
These degrees have translated to more management positions held
by women—in 2019, women held 51.8% of all management

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS (last visited Apr. 5,
2021).
171. Anne Stych, Women Gaining Corporate Board Seats at a Faster Rate
than Men, Study Shows, BIZ WOMEN (Sept. 12, 2020, 9:32 AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/news/latest-news/2020/09/women-gainingcorporate-board-seats-faster-rate.html?page=all.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Women on Corporate Boards, supra note 18.
175. Id.
176. Women in the Workforce: United States (Quick Take), CATALYST (Oct.
14,
2020),
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-in-the-workforce-unitedstates/.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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positions.180 Unfortunately, that is where the female climb to the top
stops. In May of 2020, the Fortune 500 list revealed a record high
number of thirty seven female CEOs. 181 On the other hand, there were
463 CEO positions held by men in companies on the same list. 182
Additionally, the overwhelming majority of boards are still
dominated by men. In 2019, men held three-quarters of S&P 500
board seats, while women held one-quarter. 183 Of the top 200
companies in the S&P 500, only 6% of board seats were held by
women of color, 4% by Black women, 1% by Latinas, and 1% by
Asian women. In 2018, men held 77.5% of Fortune 500 board seats,
while women held 22.5%—only 4.6% were held by women of
color. 184
At the onset of 2020, female representation of women in corporate
America was trending upward and was most pronounced in senior
management. “Between January 2015 and January 2020,
representation of women in senior-vice-president positions grew from
23 to 28 percent, and representation in the C-suite grew from 17 to 21
percent.” 185 Unfortunately, the coronavirus pandemic has added
another roadblock to the female climb up the corporate ladder.
A. The Pandemic’s Intensification of United States
Workforce Gender Disparities
Women, particularly working women, have been especially
impacted by the pandemic. 186 During the pandemic, women of color
were generally laid off or furloughed at the higher rates, which
undoubtedly will stall their careers and jeopardize their financial
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Burnes et al., supra note 71.
186. Id. Also note, French women have been more affected by the pandemic
than men. Between February 2020 and May 2020, women have had a 0.7 point
increase compared to 0.2 points for men. See Evolution of the Unemployment Rate
After the Covid-19 Lockdown in France from February to May 2020, by Age and
Gender, STATISTA https://www.statista.com/statistics/1135815/unemployment-ratefrance-before-after-lockdown-coronavirus-by-age-and-gender/ (last visited Apr. 5,
2021).
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security. 187 Even before the pandemic, working mothers worked a
“double shift” consisting of work and household responsibilities.188
Since working and schooling from home became the only
choice for many, the double shift merged. Once schools closed,
women accounted for 80% of the 1.1 million people who left the
workforce. 189 As a result, more than a quarter of women in the United
States are downshifting their careers or leaving the workforce
completely in what is being deemed “an emergency for corporate
America.” 190 Companies are losing women in leadership positions and
unwinding years of painstaking progress toward gender equity. 191
Because of the economic downturn caused by the coronavirus
pandemic, efforts to achieve gender equality will need to double.192
Historically, economic downturns disproportionately affect women
and tend to push the topic of gender equality aside. 193 Many women
work in industries, which patrons sacrifice first to save on their
personal finances and are, therefore, disproportionately affected by
economic slumps. 194 As of May 2020, women in the United States
represented 39% of the workforce but suffered a majority of the jobs
lost. 195 Fewer women in the overall workforce will undoubtedly slow
the female climb up the corporate ladder.

187. Burnes et. al, supra note 71.
188. Id.
189. Kweilin Ellingrud & Liz Hilton Segel, Covid-19 has Driven Millions of
Women out of the Workforce. Here’s how to Help Them Come Back, FORTUNE (Feb.
13, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/02/13/covid-19-women-workforceunemployment-gender-gap-recovery/.
190. Burnes et al., supra note 71.
191. Id.
192. Marie Froehlicher et al., Gender Equality in the Workplace: Going
Beyond Women on the Board, S&P GLOBAL (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://www.spglobal.com/esg/csa/yearbook/articles/gender-equality-workplacegoing-beyond-women-on-the-board.
193. Id.
194. Id. (“Women are over-represented in sectors which are most heavily hit
by the pandemic, such as hospitality or the food services industries, further
exacerbating inequalities.”)
195. Deepa Mahajan, Olivia White, Anu Madgavkar & Mekala Krishnan,
Don’t Let the Pandemic Set Back Gender Equality, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 16,
2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/09/dont-let-the-pandemic-set-back-gender-equality
(Women suffered 54% of the overall job loss).
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Scarcer women in corporate America not only reverses progress
in gender parity among corporate leadership, but it may also lead to
consequences for corporations themselves. Company profits and share
performance are nearly 50% higher when women are represented at
the top. 196 Senior women are also more likely to “champion racial and
gender diversity.” 197 More than half of executive women say they
consistently take a public stand for gender and racial equity at work,
whereas only 40% of executive men can claim the same. 198
Additionally, women at all levels benefit from female leadership as
allies and support systems. 199
L’Oréal serves as an excellent case study to demonstrate the
power of diversity and inclusion initiatives. Although L’Oréal was
founded in France, it has a massive presence in the United States and
around the world. In fact, L’Oréal is one of the few companies that
“accelerated its growth in the fourth quarter of 2020,” despite the
worldwide financial crisis induced by the coronavirus pandemic. 200
L’Oréal’s annual report states, “[t]hanks to its balanced business
model, the Group strengthens its position as the beauty market leader
and maintains its profitability at 18.6%.” 201
In 2019, L’Oréal USA was recognized as “a leader in creating an
inclusive workplace by Diversity Best Practices (DBP), a division of
Working Mother Media,” and a Top 10 Percent Inclusion Index
Company. 202 This year, in 2021, L’Oréal convened its first Global
Diversity & Inclusion Advisory Board, whose role “is to foster open
discussion on how to strengthen L’Oréal’s commitments and enrich
[its] Diversity & Inclusion strategy.” 203 Notably, L’Oréal’s Board of
196. Burnes et al., supra note 71.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 2020 Annual Report, L’ORÉAL (2020), https://www.lorealfinance.com/en/annual-report-2020/loreal-in-figures-2-2-0/.
201. Id.
202. L’Oréal USA, L’Oréal USA Named To Highest Level Of Diversity Best
Practices Inclusion Index, CISION US INC. (July 30, 2019, 9:00 ET),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/loreal-usa-named-to-highest-level-ofdiversity-best-practices-inclusion-index-300892650.html.
203. L’Oréal EN News, L’Oréal Launches its Global Diversity & Inclusion
Advisory Board, L’ORÉAL, https://www.loreal.com/en/news/commitments/globaldiversity-and-inclusion-advisory-board/ (last visited May 27, 2021).
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Directors is made up of 50% women. 204 The board has stated its
diversity goals are to:
Advocate for hiring, promoting and developing people of every
ethnic group, socio-economic origin, culture, age, religion, gender
and sexual orientation as well as people with visible and invisible
disabilities . . . [as well as] [d]enounce any form of discrimination,
physical or psychological violence and offenses to human rights. 205

The company’s diversity and inclusion has certainly led to
economic success. Despite the coronavirus pandemic, L’Oréal
celebrated maintaining its position as number one in the beauty
industry, while maintaining focus on its diversity and inclusion global
growth agenda. 206 L’Oréal USA serves as a powerful example of a
United States corporation that is not only committed to celebrating
diversity, but whose bottom line indicates diversity and economic
success can go hand-in-hand in America. 207
B. Potential Progress: Nasdaq’s CGQ Proposal
The challenges women are confronting in the workforce in their
effort to climb the corporate ladder has caught Nasdaq’s attention. In a
2020 study of its own listed companies, Nasdaq found that 75% of its
companies did not have one director that self-identified as female and
one director that self-identified as Black or African American,
Hispanic or Latinx, Asian, Native American or Alaska Native, Native
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or as two or more races or ethnicities, or
as LGBTQ. 208 As a result of the findings, Nasdaq made a call to
action.
204. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 200.
205. Promoting
Diversity,
Equity
&
Inclusion,
L’ORÉAL,
https://www.loreal.com/en/commitments-and-responsibilities/for-thepeople/promoting-diversity-and-inclusion/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
206. Our
History:
The
Adventure
of
Beauty,
L’ORÉAL,
https://www.loreal.com/en/group/culture-and-heritage/l-oreal-history/ (last visited
May 27, 2021).
207. Id.
208. Chabeli Carrazana, Nasdaq wants to require companies to have women,
minority and LGBTQ, THE 19TH NEWS (Dec. 1, 2020, 12:05 PM),
https://19thnews.org/2020/12/nasdaq-proposes-companies-have-women-minoritylgbtq-board-members/.
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At the end of 2020, Nasdaq introduced new regulations for
businesses that float on their stock exchange. 209 Nasdaq leaders filed a
proposal with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to adopt new listing rules requiring companies to publish
“consistent, transparent diversity statistics” about their board of
directors. 210 According to their proposal, boards must include one
director who “self-identifies as female” and another who “selfidentifies as either an underrepresented minority or LGBTQ+.” 211 In
addition, smaller businesses and foreign companies may be given
extra flexibility. 212 The proposal seeks to ensure businesses have one
diverse director within two years. 213
According to Adena Friedman, Nasdaq’s president and CEO,
“Nasdaq’s purpose is to champion inclusive growth and prosperity to
power stronger economies . . . this listing rule is one step in a broader
journey to achieve inclusive representation across corporate
America.” 214 There are 3,249 listed companies, many of which are in
technology, an industry that has been criticized in recent news for its
lack of inclusivity. 215 Within the ten major tech companies (such as
Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Facebook) there was less
than a 2% increase in females in the workforce from 2014 to 2019, yet
these jobs pay twice the average salary. 216 Like France’s CGQ, the
Nasdaq proposal recognizes the ease in which top companies can

209. See SEC Proposal, supra note 3.
210. Rachel Ranosa, Nasdaq lays out gender diversity targets for listed
RES.
DIR.
(Dec.
9,
2020),
companies,
HUM.
https://www.hcamag.com/us/news/general/nasdaq-lays-out-gender-diversity-targetsfor-listed-companies/241504.
211. SEC Proposal, supra note 3, at 3.
212. Id. at 9.
213. Id. at 240, 252.
214. Nasdaq to Advance Diversity through New Proposed Listing
Requirements, GLOBE NEWSWIRE (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/pressrelease/nasdaq-to-advance-diversity-through-new-proposed-listing-requirements2020-12-01.
215. Carrazana, supra note 208.
216. Carrazana, supra note 208; Dain Evans, Tech companies have made big
promises, and small gains, for diversity and inclusion, THE 19TH NEWS (Aug. 21,
2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/21/apple-google-and-others-arestruggling-with-diversity.html.
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comply with financial sanctions. Thus, if companies do not comply,
they risk delisting. 217
The likelihood of Nasdaq’s proposal being implemented is still
uncertain. Newly appointed head of the SEC, Gary Gensler, is
expected to advocate for “aggressive regulation on financial
institutions and companies,” which may increase the likelihood of it
passing. 218 However, aggressive regulations are likely to prompt
resistance from big banks who oppose heightened restrictions on their
business operations. 219 To ensure the Nasdaq proposal is both adopted
by the SEC and effective in promoting gender equity in the
boardroom, informal institutions that amplify stakeholder voices must
also be emphasized.
C. Potential Pitfall: The Perils in United States Corporate
Profit-Motive
American corporations traditionally are focused on stockholders,
not stakeholders, which means profits are the top priority. 220 This
custom rule has been upheld in the court of law since 1919 and guides
many corporation’s governance and stockholder’s pocketbooks. 221 For
example, Richard Morrison, a conservative at Competitive Enterprise
Institute, urged SEC head Gary Gensler to avoid an aggressive stance
217. Id.
218. Sarah Hansen, Who is Gary Gensler, Biden’s Pick to Run the SEC?,
FORBES (Jan. 18, 2021, 9:18 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahhansen/2021/01/18/who-is-gary-gensler-bidenspick-to-run-the-sec/?sh=4aa25c0f315b.
219. Id.; See also Jeff Stein, Biden likely to tap Gary Gensler to lead SEC, but
the decision isn’t final, WASH. POST. (Jan. 12, 2021 6:21 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/01/12/gensler-biden-sec/
(“Gensler, pushed by liberals for the post, is viewed as a Wall Street critic and
would probably be opposed by the banking industry if selected. Although a former
Goldman Sachs banker, Gensler aggressively cracked down on certain forms of
risky trading while he was chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission during the Obama administration.”).
220. See Dodge et al. v. Ford Motor Co. et al., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668
(Mich. 1919) (Stockholders own part of a public company through shares of stock
and are generally more interested in the company’s short-term financial
performance. Stakeholders have an interest in the performance of a company for
reasons other than stock performance or appreciation and are generally invested in
the long-term success of a company.).
221. Id.
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on new requirements for corporations related to environmental, social,
and governance matters. Morrison stated: “I urge Mr. Gensler to focus
on the Commission’s core mission of protecting investors and
facilitating capital formation, not on divisive initiatives like forcing
companies to report on whether they’ve supported a laundry list of
political causes.” 222
Despite concerns like those expressed by Mr. Morrison, there is a
growing trend among top corporations to invest in stakeholders,
corporate social responsibility, equality, and the environment. Indeed,
gender quotas are not completely novel in the United States context.
In 2019, Vanguard announced it would require companies to report
the gender, age, and race of their board directors to prioritize diversity
hiring. 223 In 2020, BlackRock also said it would increase its black
workforce by 30% by 2024. 224 Goldman Sachs also recently
announced its commitment to reach better diversity representation
among its vice presidents by ensuring 40% are women, 7% are Black
and 9% are Latinx by 2025, and the companies Goldman Sachs takes
public must have at least one diverse board member. 225
Even the SEC, in 2011, amended its corporate governance
disclosure rules to require companies to report whether “they consider
diversity when searching for a new board member and if they have a
policy that addresses the consideration of diversity when searching for
candidates.” 226 Later, in February of 2019, the SEC released new
Compliance Disclosure Interpretations “requiring companies to
explain how they factor diversity into nomination decisions and other
222. Hansen, supra note 218.
223. Ross Kerber, Vanguard Seeks More Boardroom Diversity and Wants
Details, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2019, 5:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usvanguard-boards/vanguard-seeks-more-boardroom-diversity-and-wants-detailsidUSKCN1VK1FU.
224. Annie Massa, Fink Promises 30% More Black Employees at BlackRock
by 2024, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2020, 4:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2020-06-22/blackrock-vows-to-double-ranks-of-senior-blackleaders.
225. David Soloman, Update on Inclusion and Diversity at Goldman Sachs,
Including New Aspirational Goals, GOLDMAN SACHS (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/current/update-oninclusion-and-diversity.html.
226. Andrew Strickler, NYSE, Nasdaq Behind Foreign Exchanges On Gender
Diversity, LAW 360 (Oct. 14, 2014, 7:30 PM), https://www.law360.com
articles/586340/nyse-nasdaq-behind-foreign-exchanges-on-gender-diversity.
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company policies.” 227 In May of 2019, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) announced the formation of the NYSE Board Advisory
Council, which aims to connect diverse candidates with companies
seeking new directors. 228
It is clear that modern corporations and firms are benefiting from
diversifying their leadership. A 2020 study from an investment firm
found that companies with two or more “diverse” directors in its
portfolio saw earnings grow by 12.3% in the past three years,
compared to 0.5% growth from non-diverse boards. 229 Additionally, a
2015 study found companies in the top quartile for gender diversity
were 15% more likely to have financial returns above the national
median.” 230 Companies in the top quartile on racial and ethnic
diversity were 35% more likely to see higher returns than the national
median. 231
Nonetheless, the arguments against placing mandates on the free
market are also prominent. Some argue the need to analyze the skill
and talent of individuals, rather than physical appearances. 232
Supporters of the free market, who also recognize the value in a
diverse workforce, argue that if a company wants to be “smart” and
recruit a diverse workforce, it should have to figure out how to
achieve that competitive advantage on its own. 233 Opponents of
Nasdaq’s CGQ contend that beyond demanding honest management

227. Sunitha Malepati, The Future (Public Company Boardroom) Is Female:
From California SB 826 to a Gender Diversity Listing Standard, 28 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 493, 495-6.
228. The New York Stock Exchange, Initiative to Advance Board Diversity,
NYSE https://www.nyse.com/boardadvisory/about-the-council (last visited Apr. 5,
2021).
229. Jason Thomas & Megan Starr, From Impact Investing to Investing for
Impact, THE CARLYLE GRP. https://www.carlyle.com/sites/default/files/202002/From%20Impact%20Investing%20to%20Investing%20for%20Impact_022420.p
df (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
230. Vivian Hunt, Dennis Layton & Sara Prince, Why Diversity Matters
MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions
/people-and-organizational-performance/our-insights/why-diversity-matters.
231. Id.
232. The Editorial Board, The Woke Nasdaq, WALL ST. J. OP. (Dec. 1, 2020,
6:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-woke-nasdaq-11606865986.
233. Id.
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and transparency for shareholders, Nasdaq has no role in dictating
personnel decisions. 234
Nonetheless, California has already begun to lead the United
States into an era of CGQs. Although two lawsuits have been filed in
response to the California quota (SB 826), neither suit was brought by
a corporation that is compelled to comply. 235 The first lawsuit was
filed by Judicial Watch (a conservative government watchdog) who
sued on behalf of three California taxpayers to block California from
implementing the CGQ. 236 They allege the gender quota is
unconstitutional under the California Constitution. 237 The second
lawsuit was filed by a shareholder of OSI Systems, Inc., a publicly
traded company. 238 The shareholder alleged the law infringes on his
“right to vote for the candidate of his choice, free from the threat that
the corporation will be fined if he votes without regard to sex.” 239
Those in favor of CGQs recognize that “it is a statistical anomaly
that boards of directors are predominantly white men.” Pam Kostka,
the CEO of a nonprofit that is working to add more female venture
capitalists and more female founders, said:
You have to work intentionally to create a structure that’s so onesided . . . Just as boards have stayed intentionally White and male,
the Nasdaq proposal is equally intentional . . . by striking at the
underpinnings of the status quo and structural obstacles to make
long overdue changes. 240

Corporate boards may be wary to change their status quo if they
are profiting with their current all-white-male structures. Boards may
even work intentionally to undermine diversity initiatives for fear that
financial output will suffer from mandated female board participation.
234. Id.
235. Complaint at 1-2, Crest v. Padilla, No. 19ST-CV-27561 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 6, 2019); Complaint at 1-2, Meland v. Padilla, No. 19-cv-02288 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 13, 2019) (The court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing on April 20,
2020.).
236. Complaint at 1-2, Crest v. Padilla, No. 19ST-CV-27561 (2019).
237. Id.
238. Complaint at 1-2, Meland v. Padilla, No. 19-cv-02288 (2019).
239. Keith Bishop & Allen Matkins, California Board Gender Quota
Law Challenged in Federal Court, JD SUPRA (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.
jdsupra.com/legalnews/california-board-gender-quota-law-97093.
240. Carrazana, supra note 208.
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Thus, for the United States to celebrate gender equity in the
boardroom, it is imperative to enact a hard law with sanctions that
assure compliance. It is also crucial to address the informal structures
that affect director and shareholder buy-in to reach the level of equity
France has obtained.
IV. INTUITIONAL UPHEAVAL AS NECESSARY TO CREATE FEMALE
CORPORATE BOARD PARTICIPATION
In order for the Nasdaq CGQ proposal to accomplish the goals it
purports—to increase meaningful contributions from diverse voices
on corporate boards and upset the corporate homogeneity that has
become the norm—lessons should be gleaned from international
CGQs, and particularly from France. 241
As evidenced by France’s first attempt to increase corporate
gender diversity, a CGQ without any sanctions lacks teeth and will not
have its intended meaningful impact. 242 Nasdaq’s proposed “comply
or explain” mandate—with its added sanction of delisting—provides
sufficient encouragement for companies to comply. Much like the
sanctions provided by France’s second, more successful attempt at a
CGQ, Nasdaq’s proposed sanctions are also not pecuniary. Instead, by
threatening delisting for noncompliance, even the wealthiest
corporations will be incentivized to comply.
Although the experiences of France, Spain, and numerous other
countries have demonstrated that soft laws not coupled with sanctions
will have little to no impact, Nasdaq’s comply or explain provision
will force corporations to explain why they did not comply while
being backed by formidable sanctions. 243 Research on comply or
explain mandates also reveals that when individuals are asked to
explain why they took certain actions, it improves the quality their
decision-making, reduces stereotype-based thinking, and creates space
241. Winters & Jacobs-Sharma, supra note 38. Not only is France an example
of a successful and productive CGQ, but their capitalist economic structure provides
an apt comparison for the Nasdaq quota in context of the U.S.’s capitalist economic
structure.
242. See Poncelet & Hutchison, supra note 115, at 90-91 (Among other
factors, the dense network of board interlocks play a significant role in board
nomination and thus the voluntary guidelines made little progress in forcing
directors to look beyond their social circles.).
243. Poncelet & Hutchison, supra note 115, at 90.
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for underrepresented groups. 244 Additionally, since the mandate
expands the diversity of directors the free market will, in turn, expand.
Although Nasdaq’s proposal for only two diverse board members
may be too modest in the long-term, and more aggressive mandates
may be necessary in the near future, this modest approach may be an
adequate first step for United States corporations to begin broadening
their director applicant pool. 245 Moreover, diversity on corporate
boards promotes financial success. 246 According to a report from the
Boston Consulting Group, companies with more diverse leadership
teams report higher innovation revenues. 247 Because “[w]omen [and]
people of color often have different experiences [a]nd with that can
come diversity of thought . . . it’s shown that diversity of thought can
really aid organizations.” 248 Corporations who comply and exceed the
modest mandate, may still receive a competitive advantage from
employing diverse individuals. 249
It is clear some sort of mandate is necessary to prompt
corporations to realize the untapped potential of countless
professional, educated, well-qualified females, given their history of
subordination in both formal and informal American institutions.250
To overcome the informal barriers, support from stakeholders is
key. 251 Like France, United States’ stakeholder voices are on the
rise. 252 Stakeholders apply additional controls on corporations and
executives, outside the traditional formal institutions and are
encouraging corporate diversity. 253
Stakeholders lobby for corporate social responsibility, equality,
and causes beyond the bottom line.254 In addition, stakeholders prove
to be vital in ensuring corporate boards mirror modern-day America—
where women are maintaining professional careers and also balancing
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Winters & Jacobs-Sharma, supra note 38, at 23.
SEC Proposal, supra note 3, at 3.
Id. at 9.
Evans, supra note 216.
Id.
SEC Proposal, supra note 3, at 9.
See Shapiro, supra note 6.
See generally SEC Proposal, supra note 3, at 14-15.
Zenou et al., supra note 49.
Id.
Id.
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domestic responsibilities. 255 Nevertheless, a hard law mandating the
CGQ is a necessary first step to overcoming the social and cultural
challenges women are currently facing when they endeavor to join
corporate boards and to upend the formal institutional barriers.
Work-life balance advocacy will also be imperative to attain
gender equity in the boardroom, in particular, increased paternity and
maternity leave as well as eliminating the gender wage gap. 256 As
women continue to enter the workforce and rise in ranks, more female
breadwinners will emerge. 257 Society must respond with equal
opportunities for men and women to take care of the home while also
recognizing the innate experiences women face by virtue of carrying
children. Informal institutions and cultural norms will change and
adapt alongside formal institutions and corporate norms. This is
evidenced by France’s onset of female networks, public institution
training programs, and corporations surpassing the quota to achieve
even greater female participation on corporate boards. 258
Additionally, the political elite must recognize the importance of
gender equality. 259 France’s President has appointed officials
specifically dedicated to eradicating gender inequality. 260 Similarly, in
the United States, President Joe Biden appointed a record number of
women to his cabinet, 261 and he himself has expressed a need to close
the gender wage gap. 262 Increased female leadership in political
positions and support from the President will promote gender equity
255. See Devillard et al., supra note 62.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Poncelet & Hutchison, supra note 115, at 90.
259. See generally Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 50, at 895.
260. Ministère De L’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, France’s International
Strategy for Gender Equality (2018-2022), FRANCE DIPL. (Feb. 2021),
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/feminist-diplomacy/frances-international-strategy-for-gender-equality-2018-2022/.
261. Deena Zaru, Biden Cabinet Picks Feature Record Number of Women and
Women
of Color, ABC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2021, 10:47 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-cabinet-picks-feature-record-number-womenwomen/story?id=75380370.
262. John L. Dormaan, Biden White House has Majority-Female Staff,
Narrowed Gender Pay Gap to 1%,” BUSINESSINSIDER (July 2, 2021, 12:59 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/biden-white-house-majority-female-appointeesstaff-narrowed-pay-gap-2021-7.
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throughout the country, and even on corporate boards, as evidenced by
France. 263
CONCLUSION
Overall, formal institutional shifts in the form of CGQs paired
with strong sanctions and improved employment terms will
significantly improve gender equity in the boardroom. Informal
institutional changes in the form of stakeholder advocacy for gender
equality, work-life balance, and transformed gender norms also
advance gender equity. Furthermore, political pressure to promote
gender-equality legislation for corporate boards and addresses other
social and economic areas will promote gender equity across formal
and informal institutions. 264 Once both institutions adapt to these
evolved egalitarian norms, Nasdaq and other CGQs will celebrate farreaching success.
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